U.S. Role in the Arab/Israeli Conflict Post 1967
By: Ian Livingston
December 2004

The United States’ role in the Arab/Israeli conflict has been a top one since the modern Jewish state was born. As the first country to recognize Israel as a nation in 1948 (11 minutes after creation on May 14), the United States has continually supported its right to be. The level of cooperation between the two states has differed over the course of time, but never has the U.S. questioned Israel’s right to exist. Throughout the past several decades the U.S. has been eager to develop a relationship with a like-minded nation in the Middle East; this is partly due to the U.S. goal of achieving regional stability in the region. During the height of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to act as a counterweight to Soviet incursions into the region in order to contain the spread of Communism. The Middle East also has great importance to the world energy market; a market the U.S. now sees itself as a protector of (especially in the absence of the formal Colonial powers of Europe). These U.S. interests have combined to create the impression that the U.S. is in favor of one side (Israel) more than the other (Palestine). This impression, right or wrong, has caused continued difficulty in finding a settlement to an issue that continues to be of great importance to the U.S.

The June 1967 war between Israel and its neighboring Arab states changed the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East in more ways than anything had since the 1948 victory. After the proverbial dust settled and the six day war was over, Israel controlled more land than it had at any other time since the states modern inception. Each state that allied to attack Israel also lost significant portions of land. Israel gained control of the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, the West Bank from Jordan, and also gained an important political and symbolic footing in eastern Jerusalem. These acquisitions have since led to decades of diplomacy efforts on many fronts. Each side has continued to vie for the land that they feel is rightfully theirs. Some of the problems have been solved, yet many remain. Through it all, the United States has continued to act as an intermediary for a Middle East peace. U.S. interests in the region are large, and everyone from government officials to the common citizen has voiced their opinion on the matter.

Immediately following the war of 1967, the United Nations issued Security Resolution 242. This resolution would later become the “be all, and end all” for many regional disputes. It was meant to be a foundation for peace, and designed to make each side content. UN 242 called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories in exchange for recognition of Israel by the Arab states. In exchange, the Arab states had to promise freedom of navigation through international waters. The resolution also called for a “just” settlement of the refugee problem (1). Debate about the resolution immediately began on both fronts, as well as in Washington. The official U.S. position would be to back the UN resolution and push for peace. Unfortunately, peace was short lived, and hostilities reached another boiling point in 1973.

The peace process, post 1967, had shown some signs of progress. In 1971, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat conveyed eagerness to sign a peace treaty with Israel if they, in turn, would agree to the terms of UN 242. He was indeed willing to agree to a separate Israeli/Egyptian peace plan—an idea that did not go over well in the Arab world (2). However, by late 1972, Sadat began to change his tone and signaled that he would go to war if in fact the U.S. failed to force Israel to agree to 242. Missed intelligence, and the Israeli belief that recently defeated foes would not attack led to the outbreak of war on October 6, 1973 (3).

Throughout the 1970’s, U.S. attitude towards Israel became more and more friendly. This friendliness acted to give the perception that the U.S. favored Israel in many cases, but diplomatic efforts continued. In 1977, a dramatic shift occurred in the Israeli Knesset (Parliament) when the Likud party gained majority control. The increasingly peace oriented policies of the Labor party were now threatened by the decidedly hard-line stance of the right-wing Likud government. From September 5 to 17, 1978, President Carter invited Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel to Camp David to discuss peace (4). Almost immediately, it became apparent that Begin would not agree to the terms set forth by UN 242. The issue of Israel leaving the occupied West Bank and Gaza was something he considered not to be for debate--it would simply not happen. As the Likud spokesman, he would remain steadfast to the party wishes of increased settlement, blurring the border, and looking for Palestinian leadership outside the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (5). The Israeli government found support from the U.S. since, “… the Americans felt the questions of sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, as well as the status of Jerusalem, should be deferred (6).” After the Camp David summit was held, Arab leaders met to discuss their feelings on the debate. Numerous leaders demanded that a tougher stance be taken on the Palestinian issue. On November 5, 1977 they convened in Baghdad where they, “criticized the Camp David Accords, and they decided that the headquarters of the Arab League was to be moved from Cairo if Egypt and Israel reached a peace treaty (7).”

During the 1980’s most attempts to settle the issue brought successes and failures, few of which were groundbreaking. The most significant focus on the Middle East during this period was in the context of Reagan’s East/West global mindset, where his administration believed everything had to do with the U.S./Soviet relationship (8). The Iran/Iraq war kept Iraq occupied to the point that Israel felt somewhat safe from the “eastern front” threat, and all was relatively peaceful. The outbreak of the first Intifada (uprising) in 1987 marked the first major PLO phase of the Arab/Israeli war (9). It also sent a signal to Washington that peace in the Middle East was still not in reach.

The 1990’s brought an end to the Cold war between the Soviet Union and the U.S. Competing interests in the Middle East became defunct, and the U.S. found itself in the position of lone superpower. Washington insiders began to believe that the time had finally come for peace. As Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, U.S. officials started contemplating end-game (war leads to peace mindset) options for the greater Middle East. Though the U.S. was hesitant to enter the region, the acquiescence of neighboring Arab states allowed the U.S. to push forward to liberate Kuwait. After the war, the U.S. would work with its former foe (now Russia) and bring all parties to the table. The liberation of Kuwait and quick cessation of the Gulf conflict was likely the one policy that best advanced U.S. interests in the region. The opportunities seemed limitless; the U.S. enjoyed unusual support amongst Arab states, the eastern front threat Israel feared in the Iraqi army was defeated, and the Cold War enemies were willing to work together to find a settlement (10). No one expected that the greatest setbacks were to come just a few short years later.

Following the Gulf War, the Madrid Peace Conference was the first significant step towards a multi-year sustained push for peace, one that was sponsored in large by the U.S. When President George H.W. Bush left office he and his administration had begun to pave the way towards a real and lasting peace. In March of 1991 he spoke before Congress and said, “A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242… (11)” This was a groundbreaking comment from a U.S. official (let alone the president), because it implied that in order for peace, Israel was going to have to finally commit to fulfilling the recommendations of the UN.

The largest setback to the peace process culminated in the 7-year (1993-2000) hal-hearted push for peace by the U.S. under President Bill Clinton. Clinton entered office as a novice in Middle Eastern affairs, but he was known as a quick learner and an apt statesman. Still, “no one could be sure whether he had a clear idea of where he wanted to go with foreign policy in the uncertain post-Cold War era (12).” Seemingly major advances were made with the first Oslo Accords in 1993, where the Israelis finally recognized and negotiated with the PLO. The Clinton Administration was apparently not bothered by the fact that Israel; was not willing to freeze settlements, did not lay out a framework for dealing with refugees, and did not say they would withdraw in accordance with UN 242 (13). These issues that had been addressed by the prior administration would remain unsolved.

The early to mid 90’s later featured other achievements such as Oslo II, the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan, and progress with Syria (a long time enemy of Israel) (14). Yet, despite all the good news, “nothing happened in Clinton’s first term comparable to the Kissinger shuttles, Camp David, or Baker’s organization of the Madrid Conference (15).” Instead of taking the immensely pro-active role the U.S. had envisioned in the period after the Gulf War, the administration decided to play ball from the side-lines, allowing the parties to continue their several-decade long stance of approaching the problem through respective lenses of denial. When the Israelis mentioned their willingness to see a Palestinian state, “Clinton adhered to the policy that the United States did not support a Palestinian state (16).”

Peace talks continued with Camp David II. Instead of taking the most active role possible to ensure peace, the U.S., led by President Clinton, again decided to let the actors come to their own conclusions. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak arrived at the meeting willing to cooperate, while Yasser Arafat waffled. Clinton, however, avoided taking a stand one way or another, because he did not want to “force” an American plan. After several days of meetings, the chances for agreement dwindled and another opportunity was missed.

The Gulf War to liberate Kuwait was believed to be a surefire way to acquire lasting peace in the Middle East. The U.S. worked with Arab allies to defend a helpless nation from a menacing foe. The possibility that the U.S. could “solve two problems with one stone” was very real, and the prospects were great. The ultimate goal of regional stability in the oil-producing capitols of the world was nearly at hand. Instead of taking a true stance, and pushing both sides to make concessions, the U.S. wasted many years on what can now be considered the most signigicant setback to the Middle East peace process. William Quandt sums it up well, “If there were a criticism that seemed valid, it would be not so much that Clinton mishandled the negotiations at Camp David, but that so little of the preceding seven years had been used to lay the basis for the substantive discussion of the issues that finally came into focus at the summit (17).” Singular achievements mean nothing when end-game goals are never met. The eruption of the al Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 showed the world that the results of this supposed “final” push for peace had failed.