The U.S. War on Terror: Afghanistan to Iraq
By: Ian Livingston
December 2004

The United States’ (U.S.) global War on Terror (WOT) has been at the forefront of U.S. policy options, and it has guided all eventual overseas actions, since the attack on 11 September, 2001. The U.S. retaliation against the al Qa’ida harboring Taliban in Afghanistan was expected; the U.S. led operation was also widely supported throughout the world. Ousting a rogue government and displacing al Qa’ida fighters was an immediate short term success, but it was only the opening volley of the still youthful global WOT, and many more successes will be needed for victory. The vision of a “post 9/11 world” has brought with it policy objectives that have been ignored in the past as outlandish or extreme. Afghanistan has been coined “phase one” of the WOT, and the Bush administration has since tried to convince the world that Iraq is “phase two.” Objectives in the WOT are broad and broadening. The two “center points” of the current U.S. WOT each find themselves in the position of being used as test subjects for the new American diplomacy .

After 9/11, Usama bin Laden and his organization of al Qa’ida [the Base] quickly became everyday names in the West. A mysterious man from a far away place appeared on television to tell Americans how he felt, and why he felt the way he did. With his position in the geopolitical world newly cemented, people listened. His name was new to many, but it was well known in government circles and had floated around in the media from time to time since his declaration of war on the U.S. in 1996. The first cry for Jihad was directed against forces (deployed in the lead-up to the first Gulf War) and interests stationed in the Arabian Peninsula that year. Bin Laden reminded the world of his intentions in 1998, when he broadened his directive. His war broadened and he advocated the killing of any Americans, wherever they may be found. He made good on his rhetoric when he oversaw the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. After the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, while at was at port in Yemen, he praised the men who had followed the wisdom of al Qa’ida. Many other al Qa’ida attacks occurred against U.S. interests prior to 2001, but on 11 September, the once foreign names were still very new to most Americans. The understanding of al Qa'ida's cause was even more of a mystery.

The U.S. response to 9/11 began on 7 October, 2001—26 days after 9/11. For nearly 4 weeks, al Qa’ida and Taliban fighters had ample opportunity to slip out of the country’s immense and porous borders. In addition, the top leadership of both organizations; Usama bin Laden, Mullah Muhammad Omar, and Ayman al Zawahri presumably had advanced warning of several days that the attack was coming. The failure of U.S. officials to react quickly enough left these three leading men over one month to flee before the first U.S. soldiers set foot in Afghanistan. The Anonymous author of Imperial Hubris notes that, “In this context, America probably lost the war against al Qaeda on 11 September because the U.S. military had been caught completely unprepared (1).” When a war is launched in an ill-advised manner, as it appears the U.S. WOT was, there is only room for improvement. Unfortunately, in “phase one” of Afghanistan, there have been fewer positive signs for the U.S. than negative ones.

Two major success stories in Afghanistan came with the quick routing of Taliban forces in large urban areas and the dismantling of an operational base for al Qa’ida. But problems exist. In the WOT, each success is difficult to quantify individually because the extremist network is intricate and well balanced. The simple loss of one link, will not destroy the larger chain. More troubling is the fact that many success have been accompanied by failures on some level. When the U.S. invaded Afghanistan, policy makers decided the best option would be to attempt to unite long warring factions through bribery. Many of these factions agreed to U.S. demands, but their actual effectiveness as well has their allegiance has been: questionable at best. U.S. forces and their Afghan counterparts have taken control of all the major cities, but Taliban related violence still occurs on nearly a daily basis. The vast and largely undeveloped landscape of Afghanistan still contains numerous anti-U.S. factions. They now sit, largely undetectable, in wait for an opportune moment to strike.

In Afghanistan, the bad often outweighs the good. The top enemy targets fled populous areas and may be hiding out in the mountainous terrain covering the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region. Outside the initial - largely symbolic - victories, the U.S. war plan has been plagued by indecisive action. The indecisive action can be attributed to the continued belief that the enemy is defeated. Unfortunately, the quick victory mind set of those in power is not always relevant in real wartime situations. Michael Sheuer notes that, “The second half of 2003 and early 2004 saw a substantial increase in Taleban and al Qaeda attacks on the military forces of the Karzai government and the U.S.-led coalition (2).” One should conclude from these statistics that the resistance in Afghanistan still exists, and in fact: it may be thriving.

Despite the questionable conditions in Afghanistan, elections were recently held, and Hamid Karzai was democratically elected president in early-autumn, 2004. As with past U.S. victories in Afghanistan, this appears to be another case in which negatives counterbalance or even outweigh positives. Scott Baldauf of Christian Science Monitor informed readers of the following:

When the above statement is combined with the comments from Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (a former Northern Alliance commander), images of what lies ahead in Afghanistan become intriguing. On October 2, 2001 (before the U.S. invasion), Hekmatyar announced, “We should defend our country….The Talebans fought against us [the Northern Alliance], but we will forget all about our disputes with them and fight against our common enemy (4).” Quite similar to the time when the mujahideen came together to fight off the Soviet Union, the call for unity has again risen in Afghanistan. The future years will show whether or not the mujahideen answer in the same way.

While war was still young in Afghanistan, the Bush Administration decided the time had come to re-evaluate the often shaky U.S./Iraq policy. The debate amongst top administration officials was interesting in that many agreed on invading Iraq, but few agreed on how. The decision was made to formally put Iraq on notice when President Bush gave his now infamous axis-of-evil speech. As it turned out, this speech would set the future tone between the U.S. and the allies it had bonded with since the end of World War II. Reaction from Europe was immediately confirmed by high level sources; the French Foreign Minister spoke out to call the U.S. proposed label “simplistic (5).” Many long time European allies, not yet touched by any horrific attacks at the hands of Islamic extremists, were not ready to buy into the U.S. wishes to broaden the WOT. Instead, they chose (and still do) to remain ambivalent towards the matter.

Unfazed by the lack of allied acceptance, the Bush Administration pushed forward towards the goal of solving the long-standing Iraq crisis. Many of the same people, who signed onto the Project for a New American Century years before, now found themselves in important jobs in the Bush White House (6). In short, The Iraq debate was not a new one to many within the administration. The administration decided that it would focus on the fact that Saddam Hussein possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction. With supposed hard evidence that such a program existed, the administration was convinced that the U.S. would have justification to go to war with little allied support. The recently launched WOT gave them the ultimate justification - the resounding question of: What if? Richard Perle, a neo conservative political advisor summed it up well when he said, “The casus belli is that we know Saddam Hussein possesses chemical and biological weapons (7).” The administration deduced that in this age of new threat, an adversary such as Saddam Hussein could not be permitted to have weapon capability that he could pass off to terrorists.

Enter phase two of the WOT: Iraq. Only 5 short weeks after the invasion began, the U.S. controlled a majority of the country, deposed Saddam Hussein, and took the capital of Baghdad. The military achievement was unprecedented, it was viewed as a decisive and debilitating show of force throughout the world. The war was also a sign to world leaders that the U.S. was taking a decidedly different path in diplomacy and foreign policy. The U.S. led “Coalition of the Willing” proved that a relatively small alliance - headed by the militarily hegemonic U.S. - can obtain quick victories.

The real problems in Iraq began to surface in the months after the mission was declared accomplished in late October, 2003. Possibly one of the gravest errors about the Iraq war before the invasion was made by Vice President Dick Cheney. He said, “Extremists in the region would have to rethink their strategy of jihad. Moderates throughout the region would take heart (8).” Ironically, Cheney’s first statement is correct, but for the wrong reason. Extremists are rethinking their strategy of jihad, but not in the way Cheney would have suggested. Instead of writhing in the pain of defeat, new supporters are joining the growing insurgency everyday. It is important to focus on the Iraqi insurgence, but at the same time one must re-focus on the worldwide insurgence being instigated by Usama bin Laden and his al Qa’ida network. Indeed, the ideas of Jihad have been re-thought. But unfortunately, they have taken on an even-more dire tone. Michael Sheuer writes, “The threat facing America is the defensive jihad, an Islamic military reaction triggered by an attack by non-Muslims on the Islamic faith, on Muslims, on Muslim territory, or on all three (9).” It is this "defensive" Jihad that has kept a growing numbers of moderates on the proverbial fence.

To those who advocate defensive (condoned by the Quran) jihad, Iraq (much like Afghanistan), can be viewed from the perspective above. In growing circles, the U.S. is viewed as an outside source attacking Islam. This fact is largely due to the invasion of Iraq, a place few Muslims believe should be a center of the WOT. A Pakistani political commentator notes that, “Usama bin Ladin is a liberator of the downtrodden people. They do not only respect Usama bin Laden, they love him (10).” Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq, conditions for many Iraqis have deteriorated. Those who never found themselves or their families confronted by Hussein’s bullies now find themselves living unsure lives, scared of what their country has become. These Iraqis may well be the next generation of downtrodden who will come back to haunt the U.S. with their “love” of bin Laden, his followers, and his cause.

There is no guarantee exactly what will become of Iraq. The insurgency has continued to thrive - if not grow. There is progress in parts of the country as infrastructure is slowly being rebuilt, but it is slow work. Over two decades of war and sanctions have left many sectors within Iraq in horrible disrepair; the job ahead is a long and arduous one, especially with the continued insurgency that hopes to hamper efforts. Regional cooperation (with the U.S. welcoming Iraq’s neighbors into the process) is one answer to a possible cooling of anger, but it appears as if that may be a lofty goal. A future of regional stability and cooperation is crucial to rebuilding Iraq. Without it, democracy (in any form) stands little chance.

The WOT is a battle between the U.S. and a global Islamic insurgency. The role of Iraq has become an important one because of the Invasion which deposed Saddam Hussein in 2003. Afghanistan and Iraq may, at one time, have been separate entities in the war. But they are separate no more. In assessing what we have done thus far to defeat terrorism, we must remember the motives of the insurgents that we are battling in Iraq and globally:

The main responsibility of al Qa’ida and other similar organizations is to survive, and because of this we can deduce that they plan their moves well in advance. To defeat them, we too must carefully plan each future move. Learning from the mistakes in Afghanistan and Iraq, and re-assessing end goals might be the first steps toward ending this war that threatens to continue indefinitely if treated by the West as a passing phenomenon.