Understanding the enemy, a different type of war
By: Ian Livingston
December 2004

Warfare conducted during the past century has principally been in the form of nation versus nation, alliance versus alliance, or wars of internal dispute within a nation. So called proxy-wars between the great powers also mired the geopolitical landscape during this time. Outside isolated incidences, warfare has been conducted by means of semi-standardized military combat, between opposing military forces, and has followed some general “rules.” In covert fashion, the United States’ (U.S.) war on terror started well before the attack of 11 September, 2001. Instead of being able to destroy our foe through use of large scale force, the intelligence community and law enforcement officials continue to bear most of the burden. This shift in responsibility lies in the fact that the enemy (al Qa’ida, et al.) has no permanent address for U.S. military planners to bomb and no clear-cut state sponsors for the U.S. to go to war with. The U.S. finds itself in a precarious position because the enemy could be anywhere, but many of the best leads end up being dubious. Instead of state sponsors (not counting Afghanistan under the Taliban) or a state of its own, the enemy feeds off an ideological opposition to the U.S.’ foreign policy; it also revels in the growing support it finds throughout sectors of its growing target audience.

Technology has been the main influence on warfare during the past hundred years. The German carpet bombing of London, the Allied firebombing of Dresden, the D-Day victories in France: these are all war-making plans of the past. Throughout the Western world, overwhelming mass has been replaced with elite training and “dumb” bombs have been replaced with highly accurate Global Positioning System (GPS) guided weaponry. The way the West, particularly America, wages war has changed tremendously since the last major world wars left their scars on the world. The U.S. continues to lead the way in new technology, elite forces, and military might; these factors combine to give the country a seemingly insurmountable advantage. Even though the means to wage war have increasingly favored the U.S., the way the enemy has chosen to wage war has changed.

The U.S. currently finds itself embroiled in a global insurgency led by the Islamist organization of al Qa’ida [the Base]. When speaking of al Qa’ida before the Senate in 2004, George Tenet (former Director of Central Intelligence) said the following, “He [Usama bin Laden] created al-Qa`ida to indoctrinate a worldwide movement in global jihad, with America as the enemy—an enemy to be attacked with every means at hand (1).” This statement echoes what scholar Daniel Byman wrote in 2003 when he said, “Al Qaeda is probably best defined as a religiously inspired, global insurgent movement that often uses terrorist tactics (2).” The religious angle and global scale is an important distinction between the insurgency the U.S. is currently battling and other insurgencies it has battled in the past. It is important to remember that one of the major al Qa’ida goals is to begin a global war that will prosper long after the current figureheads are gone.

Currently, the U.S. is playing a game of “catch-up,” all while trying to decide what kind of enemy the war on terror seeks to defeat. There has been wide disagreement amongst government officials, scholars, and citizens about what the ultimate goal of the war is. In order to begin to outline an end-game for the war we must come to clear conclusions about our current enemy and how it is different from enemies we have faced in the past. Once again, we can look to Daniel Byman where, in a recent article referring to al Qa’ida, he stated, “Its size, dedication, and popular appeal make it unusually formidable—perhaps uniquely so (3).” Whereas past insurgencies have been centered on a specific region, in places like Vietnam, Israel, and Chechnya; this new insurgency seeks an immense audience that is spread throughout many of the world’s countries. The enemies of al Qa’ida and its client organizations are those individuals and nations who have aided the recent U.S. led wars in the Middle East, those who support the “Zionist Entity” of Israel, and anybody (including Arab/Muslim leaders) who seeks to harm the Ummah [Islamic community] through their policies.

When bin Laden declared war against U.S. armed forces in 1996, he mentioned that the stationing of troops on Arabian soil was the greatest offense against Islam since the Prophet Muhammad died in 632 (4). While many al Qa’ida “demands” can be attributed to purely political motives, there has been a continual tendency to mix religiously interpreted obligations into the reasoning behind statements and actions. In 1998 bin Laden widened the war against the U.S., authorizing the killing of Americans wherever they are. His three reasons for the authorization were: continued U.S. presence on Arabian soil, murder (through sanctions) of 1 million Iraqi citizens since the end of the first Gulf War, and his belief that the aims of the U.S./Israeli (Crusader/Zionist) alliance were religious in and of themselves. In his decree bin Laden stated, “All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on Allah, his messenger, and Muslims (5).” This communiqué highlights the fact that bin Laden has willfully and, at times, masterfully targeted his audience of 1.3 billion Muslims worldwide. An overwhelming portion of this audience does not deem the way bin Laden fights for his cause to be the correct one. The problem for the U.S. is: if even a small percent of 1.3 billion agree with him, the U.S. is left with the challenge of defeating an intimidating number of people sympathetic to an enemy who has repeatedly announced that negotiation is not an option.

al Qa’ida stems from a Sunni Islamic religious movement called al Salafiya [the Venerable Ancestors]. The Salafi movement encompasses those Muslims who follow the Wahhabi sect of Islam, which is predominant in Saudi Arabia and amongst extremist groups such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (6). Salafis have a long tradition of disapprobation towards the West, and their message has been spread throughout large and influential circles over the past several decades through men such as Sayyid Qutb. Usama bin Laden has grasped the Salafi message and attempted to alter it slightly to justify what he is attempting to do. By giving his argument historical context, he attempts to emphasize the fact that “people of Islam should join forces and support each other to get rid of the main Infidel [the U.S.] (7).” In fact, several Islamic groups that condemned the attacks on America did so not because they disagreed with bin Laden but because they felt the time had not yet come for his revolution (8).

Even though bin Laden’s message of global jihad does not reverberate throughout all corners of Islam; he has gained popularity amongst a growing portion of the Islamic world. In a religion that is rapidly growing and one that now constitutes a significant portion of the world’s population there is mass appeal for a modern, strong, and able leader. There have been no such leaders in recent times. An anonymous CIA operative recently wrote that, “in their writings, Muslim authors have begun to discuss and assess bin Laden in terms of his resemblance to the major leaders and heroes of Islamic history (9).” The author also points out that “Muslims neutral about bin Laden seem to find clear evidence that he is, or is becoming and important Islamic leader and hero in that religion’s classic mold (10).” These ideas combine to give the impression that bin Laden is not the “crazy madman” that many Western leaders would have us to believe, but rather he is an important figure to Islam and one who will continue to find support amongst those Muslims who want to bring back a "purer" form of Islam to the world. With every new appearance on Arabic television the possibility that he and his words will become Islamic icons, even after his death, matures. Perhaps his perceived importance is the reason that, “since 1996 the CIA and US government have been working in a region where both governments and inhabitants are largely opposed to the US catching bin Laden (11).”

The U.S. finds itself battling a different type of foe than it has in the past. Instead of an adversary who is out in the open, we are chasing one through the shadows of the world's mountains and cities. The enemy is not just a man, but an ideology that is gaining respect amongst certain individuals. Since the U.S. war on terror began, our victories have been many but they are often difficult to quantify. When one person is killed or arrested for plotting against us, several more are getting their first glimpse of the true call to war on the internet. At the same time, others are planning their own “holy strike” thanks to the call to arms sent to them from bin Laden, et al. -- via al Jazeera. Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman observes that roughly 90 percent of all terrorist organizations are disrupted in their first year and those who survive that year rarely last a decade or more (12). The al Qa’ida organization and their offshoots have already proven that they can sustain themselves for several years while being hunted. Time will tell if President George Bush’s remarks on 16 September, 2001 are proven to be correct when he sstated, “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while (13).” Whether the use of the term crusade in the days after 11 September was appropriate or not, we can rest assured that this war will be like no other in recent history.